By David K. Shipler
On the
night of August 4, 1964, as two US destroyers were reporting attacks by North
Vietnamese PT boats in the Tonkin Gulf, Navy Commander James Stockdale took off
from the USS Ticonderoga to fly support. He spent more than 90 minutes below
2,000 feet searching for North Vietnamese vessels. “I had the best seat in the
house to watch that event,” he wrote in a book twenty years later, “and our
destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there .
. . there was nothing there but black water and American firepower."
Yet the
imagined incident, coming two days after an actual attack, prompted President
Lyndon Johnson to denounce Hanoi’s “repeated acts of violence” and order a
bombing run against a North Vietnamese oil depot. The sortie of 18 planes was
led, ironically, by Stockdale, who knew conclusively what had not happened but followed
orders to help “launch a war under false pretenses,” as he said in his book.
(He was shot down on a later mission, spent seven years as a POW, and in 1992
ran for vice president on Ross Perot’s ticket.)
The cautionary
tale of the Tonkin Gulf has been revived in recent days by the Trump
administration’s assertions of absolute certainty that Iran was responsible for
attacks on two oil tankers. The evidence is sketchy—primarily a video showing
Iranian Revolutionary Guards removing,
not planting, a limpet mine—and sundry sightings of Iranian vessels in the
area, as they always are. There might be intercepted communications, called
SIGINT (signal intelligence) in the trade, but they haven’t been released.