By David K. Shipler
When Vladimir Putin sent Russian
troops into Ukraine three years ago, he made several bets that might have
seemed like sure things to him then. One, that Ukraine would quickly fold. Two,
that the United States had no staying power. Three, that Europe was too
fractured to mount effective resistance.
Ukraine has
fought valiantly, however. The US under President Biden mustered huge supplies
of weaponry and diplomatic support. Europe united to provide even more aid than the US. And instead of crumbling, NATO added two new members, Sweden
and Finland.
Nevertheless, Putin’s gamble finally
began paying off last week, thanks to his admirer Donald Trump, who is so
obviously volatile that next week might be different. Putin once labeled him
unpredictable. By contrast, the Russian leader has the patience of a chess
master—albeit an emotional player, as I wrote in the Washington
Monthly two months before the invasion.
His long game relies on a wish and
a belief: his wishful, messianic ambition to expand and restore a Russian
empire, and his passionate belief that Western democracies are vulnerable to
moral decay, internal disorder, and external subversion.
He is acting in both these
dimensions simultaneously, and now has a willing (or unwitting) partner in
President Trump.
Russia has tried to accelerate the decline of democracies by exacerbating domestic divisions with online disinformation during elections, which probably helped elect Trump in 2016. Moscow is promoting pro-Russian parties in Germany and other NATO states, a Russian interference campaign that has been joined by Elon Musk and Vice President J. D. Vance, who have championed rightwing European parties with neo-Nazi sympathies.
Trump, apparently a propaganda
victim, is parroting Russian lies by denouncing Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky as an unelected dictator who started the war, fictions that are
embarrassing the United States. And for the first time in the 80 years since
World War II, the trans-Atlantic security alliance of NATO is under attack by
Washington in cahoots with Moscow. In other words, Trump’s re-election is
already proving a boon to Putin’s agenda.
Putin comes to this moment leading
a wounded, humiliated nation. And humiliation is a toxin, often overlooked as a
factor among the military and economic forces that dominate international
relations. There is nothing like lost dignity to poison a leader’s behavior.
The 1991
breakup of the Soviet Union into 15 separate countries was hailed in the West, but
Putin called it, depending on translation, “the greatest [or
great] geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” He clearly saw it as a
security problem. As the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact disintegrated, its East
European members eagerly courted membership in the opposing military
alliance—the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And NATO, pledged
to defend any member subjected to attack, gladly picked them up one by one,
trophies of the West’s supposed victory in the Cold War. The expansion of NATO
to Russia’s borders violated multiple oral promises by American and West
European leaders that the alliance would not be enlarged. Former Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev said he was “swindled.”
The sting of Russia’s diminished stature was
administered in a derisive comment by President Obama after Putin seized Crimea
from Ukraine in 2014. "Russia is a regional power that is threatening some
of its immediate neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness," Obama declared.
Putin’s response? To further humiliate
his country by invasion and internal oppression. By aggressive means, he seeks dignity
by regaining the power to swagger across the global stage. And Trump is poised
to help him.
Putin’s
two-track strategy—pursuing both short-term security and historical destiny—is
clear from his writings and speeches, which apparently go unread in the Oval
Office. They raise a question about what might restrain Putin on those two
tracks. It seems obvious that only a strong counterweight to his ambitions—from
Europe and the US—presents a deterrent. The war has cost Moscow dearly; its
armed forces have been badly damaged, much of its manufacturing has been
reoriented toward military industry, and its economic stress is growing acute.
If allowed to play out longer, those elements in themselves might deter such
adventures. But not if the aggression is now rewarded.
On
the security track, Putin’s demands include no NATO membership for Ukraine; no
European troops in Ukraine; and ideally a rollback of NATO from other nearby
countries, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (former Soviet republics), and
former Warsaw Pact members such as Poland and Hungary. Trump might grant most
of Putin’s wishes, including reducing the US military in Europe, with specific
limits or bans on certain tactical weapon systems capable of reaching Russian
territory. If NATO disintegrates under Trump’s unprecedented assault, we can
imagine Putin in the Kremlin performing whatever rhapsodic acrobatics his
72-year-old body would allow.
It is conceivable that a Putin-Trump pact
would carve up Europe into spheres of influence, as the US, the Soviet Union,
and the United Kingdom did at the 1945 Yalta conference after World War II. Trump
also might be amenable to chopping up the world into American, Russian, and
Chinese zones of hegemony—a 21st century brand of colonial
imperialism. That would betray American allies in Asia, particularly South
Korea and Japan, and pave the way for China’s takeover of Taiwan.
Oddly,
the supposed master of “the art of the deal” gave up three of his bargaining
chips before negotiations over Ukraine even began. He, Vice President J.D.
Vance, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have collectively staked out a very
weak position going into talks. They’ve already said that Ukraine will not join
NATO, will have to give up territory to Russia, and will not get the shield of
American military support that has kept the country alive in the face of the
brutal Russian onslaught.
Why
forfeit your opening position before the opening? How does the tough guy in the
White House think he can handle a canny fellow like Putin by caving in advance?
It
can be argued, as Hegseth did, that the NATO and territorial concessions are
merely statements of reality. All 32 members would have to agree to admit
Ukraine into NATO; Hungary and possibly Turkey would be expected to object. Besides,
admitting a member at war with Russia would mean a NATO war with Russia. As for
Russian-occupied territory, the virtual stalemate on the battlefield can’t be
translated into a Ukrainian victory at the negotiating table. The realities won’t
produce Ukraine’s maximalist desires.
Still,
those are positions to be traded away for something from Putin in return. Trump
seems keen to just end the war without caring about how it ends. Carelessness
will lay the groundwork for another war, and for Trump’s ignominious legacy as
an appeaser without a spine.
Nothing
in Trump’s emerging policy addresses Putin’s second track: his messianic
yearning to recreate the Russian empire, of which Ukraine is a linchpin.
“Putin’s
attachment to Ukraine often takes on emotional, spiritual, and metaphysical
overtones,” wrote Eugene
Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss back in 2021. Alongside his tangible geopolitical
concerns, they observed, he is driven by the personal compulsions of historical
fabulation and ethereal bonds to a land that he denies constitutes a country.
“By his own account,” writes
Michael Hirsh of Foreign Policy, “Putin sees himself not as the heir to
the Soviets but as a champion of Russian civilization and Moscow’s Eurasian
empire, whose roots extend back to a much earlier Vladimir—St. Vladimir, the
Grand Prince of Kyiv from about 980 to 1015. St. Vladimir was ruler of what the
Russians consider their first empire, the Slavic state known as Kievan
Rus—based, of course, in Kyiv, the capital of what is now Ukraine.”
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